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Abstract
Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contri-
bution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed.
We nd that an information chain, in which each agent directly ob-
serves only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as
eective as a fully-transparent protocol in inducing cooperation un-
der increasing returns to scale. In a comparable social dilemma, the
information chain leads to high cooperation both when compared to
a non-transparent protocol for early movers, and when compared to a
fully-transparent protocol for late movers. we conclude that informa-
tion chains facilitate cooperation by balancing positive and negative
reciprocity.
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Most economic activities are performed in a social context. More often than
not, dierent agents are working towards a common goal, although each
faces individual incentives that may be incongruent to some degree with
the common objective. Thus, team performance and the way in which the
tension between selsh and social objectives can be alleviated is at the heart
of economic interactions.
This issue has been widely acknowledged in two streams of the literature.
In a labor context, production is often determined by aggregate team per-
formance. On one hand, individual team members have personal incentives
to shirk and free ride on the eort of their peers, while on the other hand,
The employer provides them with incentives to contribute to the team pro-
ductivity. Accordingly, labor economists have dedicated considerable eort
to study production in a team and to ascertain optimal ways by which to
incentivize multiple agents to exert eort in team environments.1 A similar
situation arises with individual contributions to public goods. Here too, in-
dividuals hold the objective of raising contributions for the public good, but
have a personal incentive to defect and free ride. Numerous theoretical and
experimental studies have investigated environments that facilitate contribu-
tions to public goods.2 The reader should keep in mind that the theoretical
discussion and the experimental results can be equally applied to both con-
texts, or to any other context in which multiple agents decide whether to
make a costly investment to improve a group outcome.
In this paper we focus our attention to one basic feature of team en-
vironments, namely transparency within the team. Most, though not all,
1See, e.g.,Che and Yoo (2001), Goerg et al. (2010), Hamilton et al. (2003), Holmstrom
(1982), Lin (1997), Mohnen et al. (2008), Winter (2004, 2006).
2These include, but are not restricted to Andreoni (1988, 1990), Bergstrom et al. (1986),
Cornes and Sandler (1986), Fehr and G achter (2000), Groves and Ledyard (1977), Laont
(1987), Marx and Matthews (2000), Morgan (2000), Ostrom (1999), Varian (1994). For
surveys, see Chen (2008), Ledyard (1995).
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plest case of simultaneous moves. Conversely, in many realistic situations,
some team members are likely to obtain information about the decisions
already made by their peers. For example, a web developer working on a
webpage is aware of the eort invested by the graphic designer in producing
the designs for the webpage, and may condition her eort on the quality of
the designs; fundraisers often inform potential donors of the money collected
so far (Romano and Yildirim, 2001).3 Accordingly, in this paper, we consider
the case where agents move sequentially and may observe some or all of the
previous decisions.
Information about the decisions of other team members may in
uence an
agent's decision under several dierent assumptions. When agents have pri-
vate information about prospective benets, uninformed agents should revise
their beliefs according to observed actions of informed agents (Potters et al.,
2007; Vesterlund, 2003). Alternatively, in the presence of social preferences,
observed actions of previous movers can trigger conditional cooperation (e.g.,
Clark and Sefton, 2001; Levati et al., 2007), or social comparisons (G achter,
Nosenzo and Sefton, 2010a,b).
Several experimental studies have looked at situations in which some
players have information about the contributions of other players at the time
of making a contribution. However, in all of the studies we are aware of,
informed players have perfect information about all previous moves.4 Con-
versely, the aim of our experimental investigation is to test the ecacy of
partial transparency, and specically information chains, by which agents
observe only the immediate history. Furthermore, we extend this test to
3Publishing current levels of donations is now the standard in online fundraising sites
such as www.rstgiving.com.
4Theoretical studies include Hermalin (1998), Romano and Yildirim (2001), Varian
(1994), Vesterlund (2003). Experimental studies include Andreoni et al. (2002), Chen and
Komorita (1996), Coats and Neilson (2005), Dorsey (1992), G achter, Nosenzo, Renner and
Sefton (2010), Kurzban et al. (2001), Kurzban and Houser (2005), Levati et al. (2007),
Levati and Zultan (2011)
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parency and technology. We develop a theoretical model following Winter
(2010) to show that partial transparency is predicted to performs as well as
full transparency in inducing cooperation under increasing returns to scale.
We proceed to argue that if agents are intrinsically conditional cooperators,
similar eects might be expected even in the social dilemma (or linear pub-
lic good) induced by a linear production technology. Furthermore, as early
movers should be more likely to contribute as they are observed by more
potential followers whereas late movers are less likely to contribute as they
observe more potential defectors, we predict that the positive eects of trans-
parency decrease along the production chain.
Our experimental results validate the theoretical predictions under in-
creasing returns to scale, with partial transparency resulting in high cooper-
ation similar to that observed under full transparency. The eects of trans-
parency are not evident at the beginning of the experiment, but develop over
time as group members that play according to the equilibrium prediction
prompt their partners to follow suit.
Signicant conditional cooperation is also observed in the social dilemma,
where it is not supported by the monetary payos. Subjects are consistently
and signicantly more likely to contribute if they observe full contribution.
However, the magnitude of conditional cooperation is considerably lower than
with increasing returns to scale, so that overall contribution levels do not
dier signicantly between the three information treatments. Nonetheless,
we nd that transparency has a signicantly positive eect on early movers,
whereas full transparency has a signicantly negative eect on late movers.
As a result, highest contribution levels are observed in the informatino chain,
as it benets from the positive eect of reciprocity on early movers, while
avoiding the detrimental eect on late movers.
4
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0402 Transparency with increasing returns to scale
The interaction between transparency and technology was theoretically stud-
ied by Winter (2006, 2010), who characterized the optimal reward mecha-
nisms that can induce eort in teams under dierent information structures
and dierent production technologies. His results show that, when the pro-
duction function has increasing returns to scales, i.e., the marginal eect
of a single contribution increases in the number of contributions made by
other agents, transparency allows these complementarities to be utilized to
increase eciency in equilibrium. Due to the complementarities, an observed
contribution by one agent can incentivize the observing agents to contribute
as well, thereby enhancing the incentives of the observed agent.5
However, this clear intuition is not enough to determine the ecacy of
dierent partial-transparency environments. This question was addressed by
Winter (2010), who extended the framework to allow for general information
structures. Each information structure is represented by an acyclic directed
graph, indicating for each pair of agents whether the contribution decision
of one is observed by the other. Winter (2010) studied the mechanisms
required to induce full cooperation under minimal monetary incentives,6 to
characterize when one information structure involves more transparency, and
is thus more favorable for cooperation, than another. The conclusion is that
one information structure is more transparent than another if the closure
of the graph representing the latter is included in the closure of the graph
representing the former, i.e., if every arc that exists in one also exists in the
other (Proposition 4, p. 13). In other words, if agent i observes agent j,
5This may lead to paradoxical incentive reversals, as increasing the incentives of the
observing agent may remove the incentives of the observed agent. See Klor et al. (2011),
Winter (2009)
6The question is framed in a labor context, in which a principal determines the rewards
of the agents, contingent on the team outcome. Thus, an optimal mechanism is one under
which full contributions to the project are part of a weak-perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at
a minimal cost to the principal.
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aect the optimal mechanism required to extract full contributions from the
agents. This result is driven by the fact that the eect of the transparency is
maximized when each agent benets from contribution if and only if she does
not observe any defections. In this case, when i observes j contributing, she
infers that k has also contributed, otherwise it would have been dominated
for j to contribute.
It follows that the minimal information structure required to maximize
the incentivizing eect of transparency is an information chain, such that
the agents decide sequentially, and each agent only observes the action of
her immediate predecessor. In other words, indirect transparency can be as
ecient as direct transparency in facilitating cooperation in teams.
This is the starting point of our experimental investigation. We create a
team production environment in which we can compare behavior under dier-
ent levels of transparency in the environment. We consider three information
treatments:
No information (NI): Agents do not observe the contribution decisions of
other agents.
Chain information (CI): Each agent observes only the contribution decision of
her immediate predecessor.
Full information (FI): Each agent observes the contribution decisions of all
previous movers.
Treatments NI and FI are equivalent to the simultaneous and sequential
protocols previously studied in the literature, respectively. We construct the
environment such that, with increasing returns to scale, all agents contribute
in the unique subgame-prefect equilibrium outcome of FI, whereas no agent
contributes in the unique Nash equilibrium in NI. This environment provides
a clear backdrop against which to study indirect transparency, as manifested
in our CI treatment. Our rst hypothesis corresponds to the basic eect of
6
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ects the prediction with regard to partial
transparency:
Hypothesis 1. Contribution levels are higher in FI compared to NI.
Hypothesis 2. Contribution levels in CI are not lower than in FI.
We develop the model underlying Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the next section
before proceeding to show how a social dilemma results from changing the
production technology to a linear one, and discuss the implication of our
analysis in this setting under behavioral assumptions in Section 4.
3 Model
A team consist of a set N of n agents who contribute to a joint project. Each
agent i decides whether to contribute to the project (contribution ci = 1) or
to defect from contributing (contribution ci = 0). Contributing agents pay a
personal cost C, which is xed and equal for all agents. The outcome of the
project is given by a production technology p(k) 2 R, where k =
P
j2N ej is
the number of contributing agents, and p is increasing in k. The benet that
agent i receives from the project depends on an individual benet factor bi.
The overall payo for i is therefore:
i = p(k)bi   C
The set of agents that an agent i observes is denoted Ki. Therefore, the
information available to agent i is Ii = fej;j 2 Kig: A strategy for agent i is
a function si : 2jKij ! f0;1g, indicating whether i contributes or defects as
a function of the information she observes, i.e., the contribution decisions of
all agents in Ki. The three information structures can now be dened thus:
NI: Ki = ; for all i 2 N
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FI: Ki = f1;2;:::i   1g for all i 2 N
3.1 Equilibrium with increasing returns to scale
A technology with increasing returns to scale is characterized by p(k + 1)  
p(k) > p(k)   p(k   1) for all k. Under such a technology, the vector of
benet factors b can be constructed such that all agents defect in the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game induced by NI, and contribute in the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game corresponding to FI. More speci-
cally, the equilibrium strategy of each agent in FI is to contribute if and only




p(N)   p(i   1)
8i 2 N (1)
bi <
C
p(N   1)   p(0)
8i 2 N (2)
Condition (1) ensures that each agent has the monetary incentive to con-
tribute if by that she increases the number of contributing agents from the
full set of her predecessors to the full set N. Condition (2) is sucient to
guarantee that no agent can increase her payo by contributing if at least
one other agent did not or will not contribute.
Proposition 1. Conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that all agents contribute
in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of FI if and only if they observe
full contributions.
Proof. To see that any defection of a single agent suces to guarantee that
all other agents strictly reduce their payo by contributing, write k for the
number of agents other than i that contribute if i contributes. Thus, if i
contributes, she obtains bip(k+1) C. Because p() is increasing, i obtains by
8
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is therefore smaller than bi[p(k + 1)   p(0)]   C, which, by Condition (2) is
negative as long as k < N   1.
It follows directly that, in equilibrium, any defection by an agent in Ki
leads to a defection by i. It remains to be shown that the converse is also
true, i.e. if all agents in Ki contribute, i contributes as well in equilibrium.
First, note that in FI, i 2 Kj for all j > i, implying that by defecting i
leads all agents j to defect as well, thus obtaining a payo of bip(i   1).
Conversely, if i contributes, all agents j will contribute as well. This can be
shown by backward induction. Assuming that all agents j contribute when
observing full contributions, i increases her payo by [bip(N) C] [bip(i 
1) by contributing, which is non-negative by Condition (1). Condition (1)
also implies that the assumption holds for agent n, by that completing the
backward induction proof. End of proof.
As in Winter (2010), Conditions (1) and (2) also ensure that full contri-
bution is a sequential equilibrium in CI.7 However, there also exist sequential
equilibria in which none of the agents contribute. For example, when si = 0
for all i, i.e., all agents defect regardless of their information. The dierence
between FI and CI is rooted at the beliefs of an agent who observes her im-
mediate predecessor contributing. In the equilibrium of FI, she knows that
all previous movers have also contributed, whereas in CI she can only de-
duce it from the observed contribution. When the sequential equilibrium in
which all agents defect is considered, it is sequentially rational for the agent
to keep her prior belief that unobserved agents have defected and attribute
the observed contribution to a tremble.
Nonetheless, in the environment we consider, which corresponds to Win-
ter's (2010) optimal mechanism, we can obtain a stronger result if we impose
7Winter (2010) considered weak implementation of perfect Bayesian equilibria, though
the result easily extends to sequential equilibria. Proposition 2 can be extended to prove
a full-implementation result.
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Proposition 2. Conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that all agents contribute
in the unique sequential equilibrium of CI that satises the requirement that
all assessments attribute zero probability to all strictly-dominated strategies.8
Proof. As shown in the proof to Proposition 1, it is strictly dominated for an
agent to contribute if she observes a defection. Therefore, if agent i observes
agent i 1 contributing, she cannot rationally believe that any agent in Ki 1
has defected. Applying this argument recursively, we nd that i believes that
all previous movers have contributed. Now the backward induction can be
applied as in the proof to Proposition 1. End of proof.
In order to make a sharp distinction between FI and NI, we add a third
condition to Conditions (1) and (2):
bi <
C
p(N)   p(N   1)
9i 2 N (3)
Condition (3) and the non-concavity of p imply that defection is a dom-
inant strategy for at least one agent in NI. Taken together with Condition
(2), it rules out any contributions in equilibrium in NI. Note that Condition
(3) cannot apply to all agents. Specically, it does not apply to agent n
by Condition (1). Therefore our environment has some heterogeneity in the
benet factor b.9
8This requirement was raised by Kreps and Wilson (1982, Section 8) in the paper
that introduced the notion of sequential equilibria. It is implied by many renements of
sequential equilibria such as justiable equilibrium (McLennan, 1985), intuitive criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987), perfect sequential equilibrium (Grossman and Perry, 1986) and
stable set (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986).
9Goerg et al. (2010) have shown in a similar setup that heterogeneity has little to
no eect on behavior. Furthermore, we reduce the discrimination in our design by always
assigning the same benet factor to two agents, and rotating the roles of the agents between
participants. The design is described in detail in Section 5.
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A linear production technology p(k), is dened as one in which the marginal
contribution d = p(k + 1)   p(k) is xed for any k. It follows that a selsh
money-maximizing agent contributes i bi  C=d. Since both C and d are
exogenous, each agent has a dominant strategy either to contribute or to
defect. In other words, the actions of the other agents do not aect the
monetary incentives of an agent, hence the equilibrium analysis is not aected
by the information agents acquire about the decisions made by previous
movers. More specically, if bi < C=d for all i 2 N and
P
i2N(bid) > C, the
game is a social dilemma, in which all agents have a dominant strategy to
defect, but the outcome of full contributions pareto-dominate the outcome
of zero contributions.
4 Transparency in a social dilemma
Hypotheses 1 and 2 crucially depend on the agents playing reciprocal strate-
gies, such that an agent contributes if and only if everyone she observes
has contributed. These strategies can be in equilibrium due to the produc-
tion technology involving complementarities between the contributions of the
agents. Nonetheless, it is possible that transparency may lead to coopera-
tion even without the complementarities induced by the explicit production
technology, based on an intrinsic tendency people have for conditional coop-
eration. The experimental literature provides abundant evidence that people
have a preference to cooperate at a personal cost | only if others cooperate
as well.10 For example, 32.9% of the subjects in a study by Fischbacher and
10A behavioral propensity for conditional cooperation can be supported by underlying
preferences dened over beliefs and outcomes (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin, 1993). A utility function that
involves non-monetary benets derived from mutual cooperation (or mutual defection)
involves positive externalities between agents, eectively creating increasing returns to
scale in the production technology even if these are lacking from the monetary incentives.
For simplicity, we base our analysis on observable strategies and do not attempt a full
11
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by contributing their full endowment.11 If enough agents are conditional
cooperators, a contribution made by an observed agent is likely to lead to
contributions by subsequent movers. Thus, the eects of transparency pre-
dicted under a production technology with increasing returns to scale are
also likely to exist under a linear technology, in which there are no comple-
mentarities in material payos so that all selsh money-maximizing agents
have a dominant strategy to defect.
Note that the eects of transparency require two assumptions to be sat-
ised; rst, that agents who observe cooperation are willing to reciprocate
by cooperating at a monetary cost to themselves. More importantly, the ob-
served agents must anticipate conditional cooperation from their followers,
otherwise even agents that prefer mutual cooperation over mutual defection
would refrain from contributing as rst movers. Despite the abundant evi-
dence for the validity of the rst assumption, it is not clear that people believe
that others will reciprocate their cooperation, even in environments were
such conditional cooperation is prevalent. For example, Clark and Sefton
(2001) have found substantial levels of conditional cooperation in a sequen-
tial Prisoner's Dilemma, however overall cooperation levels were not higher
than when the game was played in the standard simultaneous protocol. In
Klor et al. (2011, Experiment 2), subjects play in all roles using the strategy
method. Although a large majority of subjects choose to reciprocate cooper-
ation at a personal cost when deciding as second movers, the same subjects
largely refrain from cooperating as rst movers. However, several eld exper-
iments have shown that charitable contributions are increased if information
about previous contributions is provided (Croson and Shang, 2008; Frey and
characterization of the agents' underlying preferences.
11See also Ashley et al. (2010), Brandts and Schram (2001), Fischbacher et al. (2001),
Guttman (1986), Keser and Van Winden (2000), Kurzban and Houser (2005), Levati and
Neugebauer (2004), Levati and Zultan (2011), Sugden (1984). G achter (2007) provides a
recent review.
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that whether transparency has an eect on contributions in our setup due to
intrinsic conditional cooperation is up for empirical investigation.
Our design allows us to compare contribution levels as transparency along
the production chain increases, as well as test conditional cooperation as
manifested in the observed actions. Accordingly, we draw our third hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis 3. Contribution levels are higher in CI and FI with a linear
production technology, due to the existence of (intrinsic) conditional cooper-
ation.
The coin of conditional cooperation has two sides. So far we have con-
sidered positive reciprocity, i.e. the tendency to be kind to those who are
kind, either due to the explicit incentives structure or to an intrinsic propen-
sity for conditional cooperation. The game-theoretic analysis reveals how
increased transparency utilizes positive reciprocity, inducing observed agents
to contribute in order to motivate their followers to contribute as well. How-
ever, when the assumptions of common knowledge of rationality and selsh
money maximization are relaxed, negative reciprocity can play a role as well.
Namely, late movers who would have contributed in absence of information
about their predecessors' decisions may withhold contributions once observ-
ing defection. Thus, in CI (but not in FI), an agent who observes defection,
can still expect to establish conditional cooperation with her followers by
contributing, even if she believes they withhold contributions after observing
a single defection. Accordingly, we hypothesize that both positive and nega-
tive reciprocity play a role in contribution decisions, and have an increasing
eect as transparency increases. Furthermore, the eect of positive reci-
procity diminishes along the production chain, as later movers are observed
by fewer agents, and therefore have a decreasing incentive to motivate fu-
ture movers. Conversely, the eect of negative reciprocity is enhanced along
13
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defection.
To see how the order of moves interacts with the information, let us con-
sider how our information treatments aect the set of agents that a specic
agent observes and is observed by when the production chain includes four
agents. In terms of being observed, and thus the scope for positive reci-
procity, the three treatments are distinguished only for the rst two movers.
The third mover is observed by exactly one agent both in CI and in FI,
whereas the forth mover is never observed in all three treatment. The oppo-
site is true for the number of agents one observes, i.e. the scope for negative
reciprocity. Namely that the three treatments are identical in this respect
with regard to the rst mover, CI and FI are indistinguishable with regard
to the second mover, so that only the last two movers observe a dierent set
of agents in the three dierent treatments.12 Our fourth hypothesis re
ects
this eect:
Hypothesis 4. The propensity to contribute is aected by an interaction of
the transparency level and the position in the production chain. Agents who
move early in the production chain are more likely to contribute as trans-
parency increases from NI to CI and FI, whereas this eect is less pronounced
(or reversed) for agents who move late in the production chain.
5 Experimental design and procedure
Participants in the experiments interacted in groups of four in a repeated
form of the team production game outlined in Section 3. To test our hy-
potheses regarding the interplay of information and production technology
12Whether negative or positive reciprocity carries more weight depends on the beliefs of
the agents. For example, if one believes that her predecessors defect, there is no room for
negative reciprocity. Our point is that both eects alter systematically along the produc-
tion change, so that the overall positive eects of increased transparency are predicted to
be diminished for later movers. We thank Johannes Abeler for pointing this out.
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# of contributors
Production technology k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
IRS 180 190 220 310 500
LIN 180 260 340 420 500
in a team setting, we manipulated the production technology and the level
of transparency to create a 3x2 between-subject design. The three trans-
parency treatments re
ect the three information structures NI, CI and FI,
whereas the two production technology treatments are designed to be either
with increasing returns to scale (IRS) or linear (LIN). The experimental
technologies are presented in Table 1.
As can be seen in the table, the output in both treatments is increas-
ing in the number of contributors, with p(0) = 180 and p(4) = 500. The
intermediate values vary with the treatment, with the return from a single
contribution increasing from 10 to 190 in IRS, compared to LIN, in which
the return from each single contribution is xed at 80.
The cost of contribution was xed in all treatments to be C = 650.
In accordance with conditions (1) and (2), the benet factor was xed at
bi = 4 for the rst and second movers, and at bi = 5 for the third and
fourth movers.13 Therefore, the monetary incentives in LIN constitute a
social dilemma: every agent loses money by contributing, whereas her payo
is higher if all four agents contribute compared to the equilibrium outcome
(cf. Section 3.2). The six treatments and the equilibria for selsh money-
maximizing agents are summarized in Table 2.
The sessions were conducted in June 2010 at the computerized Max
Planck Experimental Laboratory in Jena. Each session was composed of
13The mean marginal per-capita return (MPCR) is therefore approximately 0.55.
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Note: Nash, sequential and subgame-perfect equilibria in
treatments NI, CI and FI, respectively. 0=defect, 1=con-
tribute.
32 participants interacting in 8 groups, all in the same treatment. For each
of the six treatments we ran two sessions, i.e. 12 sessions + 1 pilot with
400 participants in total. Participants were Jena university students. The
experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and invitation
of participants was managed using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), which guaran-
teed that no subject participated in more than one session. Experimental
earnings were specied in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which were
converted to money at the end of the experiment at a conversion rate of
150 ECU = 1e. Final payos ranged from 5e to 18e, with an average of
11.73e per participant.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants read the instructions in
private, after which the instructions were read out loud to induce common
knowledge and additional questions were answered privately.14 Once all par-
ticipants indicated that they understood the instructions, a practice phase
commenced, in which participants were given the opportunity to simulate
the experiment by playing in all four roles repeatedly.
At the beginning of the experimental phase, participants were randomly
assigned to groups of four. Each group interacted over twelve periods in a
partners design. At the beginning of each period, the participants in the
14We used a labor framing following Goerg et al. (2010). A translation of the German
instructions is provided in the appendix.
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period (denoted by the letters A;B;C;D).15 Each participant in her turn was
either not informed (NI), informed about the decision of their immediate pre-
decessor (CI), or informed about all previous moves (FI) and decided whether
to contribute or not. An on-screen calculator was provided to help the par-
ticipants work out possible payos for dierent decisions (see screenshot in
the appendix). Next, participants were asked to state their expectations
about the decisions of the other group members, excluding those they were
informed about. Finally, we informed the participants about the number of
contributors in their group and of their own period earnings.
At the end of the experiment, one period was randomly selected for payo.
Additional 150 ECU were awarded for a correct expectation, randomly chosen
from the expectations made in the non-payo periods. Before leaving the lab
participants were asked to ll out a short questionnaire and were paid out
privately and individually.
6 Results
We start our analysis by looking at the eects of transparency on contri-
bution levels in the two technology treatments, at the individual and group
levels and by roles. We proceed by analysing the strategies employed by our
subjects, and specically the existence of conditional cooperative strategies
under partial and full transparency in the two technology treatments. Fi-
nally, we look at whether beliefs about past moves in the CI treatment are
updated according to belief in conditional cooperation of the intermediate
players.
15To keep the procedure consistent, we employed the same sequential protocol in all
treatments, including NI, which is equivalent to a simultaneous-moves game.
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The average contribution levels by information treatment and period are
shown in Figure 1. First, let's focus on the top panel, representing the IRS
treatments. We see that, contrary to the equilibrium prediction, contribution
levels start out highest in the NI treatment, with FI performing considerably
worse than the other two treatments. Nonetheless, there is considerable in-
crease in contributions in the two information treatments accompanied by a
sharp decrease in the baseline NI treatment. By the sixth period, contribu-
tion levels stabilize with, on average, around three out of four contributors
in CI and FI and under two out of four contributors in NI.
Table 3: Mean contribution levels
IRS LIN
NI CI FI NI CI FI
All periods 0.53 0.74 0.67 0.50 0.59 0.47
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Periods 1-6 0.62 0.69 0.57 0.54 0.62 0.52
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Periods 7-12 0.44 0.79** 0.76* 0.47 0.55 0.42
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Last period 0.41 0.78** 0.72* 0.30 0.48y 0.20
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*,** denote signicant dierence from NI at the 10 and 5 percent level, re-
spectively, two-sided Mann-Whitney test.
y Mean contributions in the last period are signicantly higher in CI than
in FI at the 5 percent level, two-sided Mann-Whitney test..
The average contribution levels in the IRS treatment are presented on
the left-hand side of Table 3, for the entire experiment as well as for blocks
of 6 periods and for the very last period. Non-parametric tests conrm the
pattern evident in Figure 1. Although overall contribution levels do not dier
between information treatments, they are signicantly higher than NI in both
18



































































Figure 1: Mean contributions
other treatments for the second half of the experiment. This pattern is also
conrmed in the mixed-eects probit regression reported in column (1) of
Table 4. Contributions signicantly decline in NI and signicantly increase
in CI ( = 0:090, SE = 0:018, p < 0:001) and in FI ( = 0:124, SE = 0:017,
19
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rst period is
signicantly lower than that observed in NI ( = 1:315, SE = 0:529, p =
0:013), but not when compared to CI ( = 0:702, SE = 0:527, p = 0:183).
Nor is the dierence between the two other treatments signicant ( = 0:613,
SE = 0:533, p = 0:250). We attribute this adverse eect of full transparency
as evidence for the immediate eect of negative reciprocity. Conversely, the
positive eects of reciprocity require of the rst movers to apply high-level
strategic thinking and belief in the rationality of their followers, and therefore
become evident only after a learning period.
Observation 1. Contributions under increasing returns to scale converge to-
wards the equilibrium predictions with time. Full transparency leads to lower
contribution rates in the beginning of the experiment, but increase with time,
while contribution rates under zero transparency decrease. Partial trans-
parency performs at least as well as full transparency.
Thus, our Hypotheses 1 and 2 are validated by the data. Columns (3)
and (4) in Table 4 apply a similar analysis on the group level to reveal the
dynamics behind the eects. As is evident in the top panels of Figure 2,
the proportion of groups that achieve full cooperation in the rst period is
similar in all information treatments. In NI, this proportion remains stable
throughout the experiment, and, in fact, from period 5 onwards there is
no change in the identity of the fully-cooperative groups. Thus, groups that
happen to consist of cooperative individuals manage to maintain cooperation
over time. The decline in average contributions in this treatment is due to
the increase in the proportion of groups in which no member contributes.
The existence of free riders in a group leads early contributors to defect in
later periods.
Conversely, in the two information treatments, it is the free riders in the
mixed groups that learn to cooperate, in line with the equilibrium, so that
16All coecients reported in the text are based on a test on the corresponding linear
combinations of coecients estimated following the regressions reported in the tables.
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IRS LIN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individual Individual Group Group Individual Individual Group Group
contribution contribution full contribution zero contribution contribution contribution full contribution zero contribution
Perioda -0.136*** -0.140*** -0.002 0.312*** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.057 0.052
(0.018) (0.019) (0.053) (0.063) (0.014) (0.014) (0.042) (0.043)
CI 2.090*** 3.658*** -1.842*** 0.243 0.493 0.344
(0.533) (1.120) (0.636) (0.228) (0.525) (0.429)
FI 1.797** 3.255*** -1.822*** -0.147 0.039 0.795*
(0.527) (1.087) (0.615) (0.229) (0.552) (0.411)
Periodax CI 0.225*** 0.233*** 0.229*** -0.308*** -0.000 0.003 -0.019 0.042
(0.026) (0.026) (0.072) (0.074) (0.020) (0.020) (0.054) (0.060)
Periodax FI 0.259*** 0.266*** 0.238*** -0.386*** -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 0.005
(0.025) (0.026) (0.069) (0.073) (0.020) (0.020) (0.058) (0.053)
Second mover -0.043 0.015
(0.176) (0.138)
Third mover 0.466** 0.729***
(0.176) (0.139)
Fourth mover 0.477** 0.479***
(0.175) (0.136)
CI x
First mover 2.667*** 0.724***
(0.572) (0.267)
Second mover 2.510*** 0.651**
(0.570) (0.267)
Third mover 1.819*** -0.053
(0.567) (0.265)
Fourth mover 1.600*** -0.258
(0.564) (0.264)
FI x
First mover 2.310*** 0.557**
(0.563) (0.268)
Second mover 2.134*** 0.416
(0.562) (0.268)
Third mover 1.487*** -0.691***
(0.559) (0.267)
Fourth mover 1.384*** -0.913***
(0.558) (0.270)
Constant -0.387 -0.626 -1.753** 0.083 -0.206 -0.529*** -1.983*** -1.384***
(0.373) (0.399) (0.792) (0.439) (0.161) (0.189) (0.411) (0.324)
Observations 2304 2304 576 576 2304 2304 576 576
Notes: Probit regressions with random eects for groups. Standard errors in parentheses.
a The last period is taken as the baseline.
*,**,*** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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ative within a few periods. Thus, when free riders and cooperative types nd
themselves in the same group, each type pulls in his direction, and the one
backed by the monetary incentives triumphs. Moreover, some of the groups
that started out with zero contributions in FI learn to overcome the initial
hurdle, as observed in the decrease in proportion of zero-contribution groups
in this treatment ( =  0:074, SE = 0:036, p=0:037). This proportion is
stable in CI ( = 0:004, SE = 0:040, p=0:921).
Observation 2. Under incresing returns to scale, fully-cooperative groups
tend to stay cooperative over time regardless of the information structure.
The decrease in contributions when actions are not observed, and the increase
in contributions with partial and full transparency are mainly due to groups
with heterogeneous contributions in the rst period that learn to converge to
the equilibrium.
Compared to the strong eects of information observed in the IRS treat-
ments, no signicant eect of the information treatments on overall contri-
butions is found in LIN, as can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 1,
the right-hand side of Table 3, and columns (5), (7) and (8) in Table 4.
However, there is a weakly-signicant tendency for more zero-cooperation
in groups when the full history is observed within the period. A weak but
signicant negative time eect is evident in all information treatments, with
a sharp decrease in contributions in NI and FI, that is not evident under CI
(although the dierence in the last period is only signicant when compar-
ing FI and CI). Thus, Our Hypothesis 3 is not supported by the aggregate
data. Nonetheless, an analysis of the contribution decisions made by the
subjects when playing in the dierent roles reveals signicant patterns that
dier according to the information structure.17
17Although not the focus of this paper, it's worth noting the eect of technology when
previous moves are unobserved. The unique equilibrium in NI is zero contributions, re-
gardless of the production technology. However, only in the social dilemma of LIN, this
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Figure 2: Group composition
Mean contribution rates by role for all treatments are presented in Fig-
equilibrium is in strictly dominant strategies, whereas in IRS a higher level of reasoning
is required from the high-reward agents. Accordingly, contributions start higher in IRS,
but decline over time to the same levels as in LIN.
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Figure 3: Contributions by role
ure 3. According to our hypothesis, the eects of transparency diminish
along the production chain, as much as reversing for the late movers in the
LIN treatments. The regressions in columns (2) and (6) in Table 4 bear out
this eect. First, note that the last two movers are more likely to contribute
than the rst two, an eect that can be attributed to the higher reward fac-
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ects of the two information treatments by
the dierent roles. In IRS, all coecients are positive and highly signicant,
indicating that subjects are more likely to contribute with both partial and
full transparency.19 However, the coecients are decreasing in value along
the production chain, with a signicant dierence in coecients between
the second and third mover ( =  0:691, SE = 0:251, p = 0:006 in CI;
 =  0:647, SE = 0:241, p = 0:007; p  0:372 for all other comparisons
between two consecutive roles).
Moving to the LIN treatment presented in Column (6) in Table 4, the
contributions levels of the two late movers do not dier signicantly between
NI and CI, and are signicantly lower in FI. The dierence between FI and
CI is also signicant ( = 0:637, SE = 0:267, p = 0:017 for the third mover;
 = 0:654, SE = 0:279, p = 0:015 for the fourth mover). We conclude that
for early movers, CI signicantly outperforms NI while not doing worse than
FI. For late movers, on the other hand, CI outperforms FI while not doing
signicantly worse than NI.20
Observation 3. Positive reciprocity due to increased transparency mostly
aects early movers, whereas negative reciprocity mainly aect late movers.
With increasing returns to scale, where the eects of positive reciprocity are
backed by the monetary incentives, they outweigh the eects of negative reci-
procity. In the social dilemma, however, contributions of late movers suer
18In the post-experimental questionnaire, one subject commented that he contributed
if and only if when the reward factor was 5.
19Column (2) in Table 4. Note that the coecients relate to the eects at the end of
the experiment. Non-parametric tests for group averages over all periods yield signicant
results only for the comparison of NI and CI for the rst and second movers (p = 0:019
and p = 0:053, respectively, two-sided Mann-Whitney test).
20This conclusion is fully supported by non-parametric two-sided Mann-Whitney tests
for the group averages over all periods presented in Figure 3. For the rst two movers, CI
leads to contribution rates higher than NI (p = 0:021 and p = 0:039, respectively), but not
signicantly dierent from those under FI (p = 0:776 and p = 0:544, respectively). For
the third and fourth movers, contributions under CI are signicantly higher than under FI
(p = 0:035 and p = 0:006, respectively), but not signicantly dierent from those under
NI (p = 0:834 and p = 0:303, respectively).
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vironment for cooperation, beneting from positive eects of transparency,
while avoiding the detrimental eects of negative reciprocity.
6.2 Conditionally cooperative strategies
Cooperation with partial and full transparency is sustained by conditional
cooperation, i.e. all agents contribute if and only if everyone they observe
has contributed. In IRS, these strategies are supported by the monetary in-
centives as the equilibrium strategies. In LIN, however, such conditionally
cooperative strategies should exist only due to intrinsic preferences. The re-
gression models presented in Table 5 study the eect of observed cooperation
on contributions. We nd that, in LIN, subjects are signicantly more likely
to contribute if they observe contribution, supporting the hypothesis that
(some of) our subjects are intrinsically conditional cooperators. The eect
over observed full cooperation is stable over time.
Conditional cooperation is drastically enhanced in IRS, where it is dic-
tated by the monetary incentive structure. Furthermore, The eect of the
technology slightly increases over time, as subjects gain experience with this
structure.21
Observation 4. Conditional cooperation is evident even in the social dilemma,
but is considerably stronger when supported by the monetary incentives.
6.3 Beliefs about unobserved previous movers
The theoretical analysis in section 3 predicts that an information chain is
as ecient as full transparency in facilitating cooperation in our setup. The
crux of this result is that a contribution made by the immediate predecessor
21The eect of time may be underestimated, as in the second part of the experiment most
groups become homogeneous, so that their members only observe cooperation, respectively
defection, leaving no room for conditional cooperation to manifest itself.
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Observing full contributions 0.824*** 1.109***
(0.223) (0.235)
Observing full contributions x 2.126*** 2.163***
IRS (0.485) (0.459)
Observing full contributions x 0.002 0.049
Perioda (0.034) (0.034)
Observing full contributions x 0.119* 0.122**





Notes: Probit regressions with random eects for groups. Standard errors in parentheses.
a The last period is taken as the baseline.
*,**,*** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
signals full contributions in the past. To test whether our subjects indeed
make this deduction, we look at the eect of observed contributions on beliefs
about previous movers in CI.22 The results of regressions by the role of the
observing and unobserved agents are presented in Table 6. We see that
22A graphical summary of the accuracy of all of the elicited beliefs across treatments
and roles is provided in the appendix.
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Third mover's belief about Fourth mover's belief about
First mover First mover Second mover
Perioda 0.017 -0.053 0.048
(0.053) (0.049) (0.054)
IRS -2.605 -0.770 -1.254
(1.668) (0.669) (0.823)
Observing contribution 1.879*** 0.909** 1.767***
(0.453) (0.396) (0.454)
Observing contribution x 0.017 0.089 -0.059
Perioda (0.070) (0.062) (0.072)
IRS x -0.257 0.049 -0.064
Perioda (0.181) (0.086) (0.105)
Observing contribution x 3.567** 1.669** 2.032**
IRS (1.739) (0.776) (0.959)
Observing contribution x 0.312 -0.075 0.142
IRS x (0.195) (0.109) (0.130)
Perioda
Constant -0.647* -0.178 -0.420
(0.354) (0.324) (0.341)
Observations 384 384 384
Notes: Probit regressions with random eects for groups. Standard errors in parentheses.
a The last period is taken as the baseline.
*,**,*** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
late movers are indeed more likely to believe that the early movers have
contributed, if the observed intermediate agent has contributed, indicating
a belief in conditional cooperation of others. This eect is signicant in
LIN, but is considerably enhanced in IRS, where conditional cooperation is
expected in equilibrium.23 Thus, our nal observation mirrors the previous
observation:
23Note, however, that conditional cooperation and belief therein is only manifested if
the observed mover sometimes plays out of equilibrium.
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social dilemma, but are considerably stronger when supported by the monetary
incentives.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies information chains in teams and their eect on individ-
ual and group performance. We analyze an environment designed to be
conductive to cooperation under full transparency and increasing returns
to scale, and show theoretically that this environment is also predicted to
induce cooperation in the unique equilibrium that emerges under an in-
formation chain, conditional on a weak epistemic requirement that agents
(are commonly known to) strongly believe that others never play dominated
strategies.
We designed an experiment to test this insight, and extended the ex-
perimental investigation to test the eects of the information chain in a
comparable social dilemma. The results support the theoretical predictions,
as cooperation in the information chain is weakly higher than in the full-
transparency environment. We nd that the eects of transparency emerge
quickly over time, as agents learn to trust their peers to understand the
incentive structure.
Behavior and beliefs in the social dilemma exhibit substantial conditional
cooperation, which has the potential to lead to higher contributions as trans-
parency increases. However, when the social preferences are not supported
by the monetary incentives, we do not observe the crisp eect found under in-
creasing returns to scale. An analysis of behavior along the production chain
reveals the con
icting eects of transparency-induced reciprocity. Trans-
parency is found to have signicant positive eects on agents who are mainly
observed, but negative eects on agents who mainly observe others.24
24An interesting extension to this line of research would be to study behavior of inter-
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been acknowledged in the theoretical literature (e.g, Andreoni and Samuel-
son, 2006; Che and Yoo, 2001; Marx and Matthews, 2000; Mohnen et al.,
2008; Varian, 1994)and studied in the eld (e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006; Hey-
wood and Jirjahn, 2004) and in the lab (e.g., Clark and Sefton, 2001; G achter,
Nosenzo, Renner and Sefton, 2010; Nosenzo and Sefton, in press). These
studies focused on full transparency, looking at how transparency can be
utilized to increase cooperation by way of conditionally-cooperative strate-
gies. To this literature we introduce the notion of partial transparency, as
manifested in the information chain, as a way to extract the potential for co-
operation inherent in transparency while mitigating the detrimental eects
associated with full transparency, which have been largely neglected so far.25
Our results suggest that an information chain is not only sucient to
induce cooperation (as in Winter, 2010), but has the potential to surpass
the benets of full transparency. Full transparency is shown to perform
almost as well as partial transparency when there are strong positive exter-
nalities between the agents and sucient opportunity for learning. However,
in early rounds, and when the externalities are weak, the relative advantage
of partial transparency increases, in particular with respect to agents who
are positioned later in the production chain.
This conclusion has practical implications across several domains. In de-
signing work environments, it has been suggested that co-location of workers
is likely to increase productivity (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004; Teasley et al.,
2002). Our results suggest that some partitioning of workers is advisable
in order to contain the eects of `rotten apples'. Conditional strategies in
the work environment can also be contractually implemented rather then
mediate agents as the production chain increases in length.
25Bag and Pepito (2011) have shown that outcome transparency can reduce contribu-
tions in a two-period two-players production game, in which eort is fully observed. The
notion of partial transparency, however, is irrelevant to games of two players, which have
also been the focus of the majority of the theoretical and empirical studies mentioned
above.
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ow of information. The design of contracts should take into
account that allowing to condition on extensive peer performance may be
inferior to more restricted contracting. Finally, fundraisers know that pro-
viding information about past donations is instrumental in attracting new
donations. Our results suggest that a full revelation of the history may be
harmful. In comparison, reporting the donations over a xed recent time
period (e.g., a week, a month, etc.) may have the advantage of avoiding any
lasting eects of low donations.
In sum, we nd that, in line with previous theoretical and empirical nd-
ings, increased transparency generally has a benecial eect on contributions
to a joint project. Although some studies failed to nd such an eect, to
the best of our knowledge this is the rst experimental study to nd that
transparency has some detrimental eect on cooperation (in early periods
and for late movers). More importantly, we nd that an information chain
can be eective in balancing the advantages and drawbacks of transparency.
Furthermore, we look at the way in which transparency interacts with the
production technology to in
uence the balance between positive and negative
reciprocity. The aim of this paper is to establish the benecial potential of
partial-transparency structures, and in particular that of information chain,
under dierent technologies. Future research is required to test the generality
and boundaries of our conclusions with regard to dierent environments. For
example, when contributions are continuous or incremental, or with larger
groups.
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Welcome! Please end now all conversation with other participants, switch o
your cell phone and read the following instructions carefully. If something
is unclear, please raise your hand and we will come to you and answer your
question individually.
The instructions are identical for all participants. During the experiment
you remain anonymous. This means that none of the other participants will
learn your identity. The experiment consists of two parts. In the rst part
you will have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the software and
the rules of the experiment. In the second part you interact in 12 repetitions
(rounds) with other participants. You can earn money in each of these 12
rounds. How much money you earn will depend on your own and on the
decisions of other participants. However, only one round will be paid out:
at the end of the experiment the computer will decide at random which
round will be relevant for the calculation of the earnings. The earnings of
each participant of the experiment will then be calculated based upon the
earnings in that round.
During the experiment all sums of money are listed in ECU (for Ex-
perimental Currency Unit). Your earnings during the experiment will be
converted to Euro at the end and paid to you in cash. The exchange rate is
150 ECU = 1 Euro.
At the beginning of the experiment you and three other participants will
be assigned to a group. The assignment is random and will remain xed
throughout the experiment. The members of a group work jointly, one after
the other on a project. There are four roles in each group A, B, C and D. A
works rst, then B, C and last D. Each group member has to decide whether
he or she works hard or normal on the project. The revenue of the project
increases with the number of hard working group members. The income of
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The wage factor depends on the position in the production process: the factor
increases for later movers.
We will now explain a round in detail. At the beginning of each round you
will be assigned one of the four roles at random. The assignment is done at
the beginning of each round via a random mechanism. Your role determines
your position in the production process and thus also your wage factor. Then
each member decides, one after the other, about his or her eort level, which
can be hard or normal. As the graph shows, A decides rst then B then C
and at last D.
NI To decide on your eort level in a round, you have to wait until the
roles before you have decided. You will learn at the end of the round, how
the other members in your group have decided.
CI To decide on your eort level in a round, you will have to wait until
the roles before you have decided. Before you make your eort decision, you
will learn what your predecessor has decided. If you have for instance role
C, you will learn whether B decided to work normal or hard. Equally your
successor D will learn, before he or she decides, whether you C has worked
hard or normal.
FI To decide on your eort level in a round, you will have to wait until
all the roles before you have decided. Before you make your eort decision
for this round, you will learn how many of your predecessors have decided to
work hard. For instance, if you have role C, you will learn how many of your
predecessors (A and B) have decided to work hard. Equally your successor
D will learn, before he or she decides, how many of his predecessors (A, B
and C) have decided to work hard.
The more members decide to work hard, the higher is the return of the
project. The return is generated according to the following table:
IRS
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individual return from project 180 190 220 310 500
LIN
Number of hard working members 0 1 2 3 4
individual return from project 180 260 340 420 500
IRS For instance if all members of the group decide to work normal, the
return is 180. If you and exactly one other member decide to work hard the
return will be 220 etc.
LIN For instance if all members of a group decide to work normal, the
return per member is 180. If you and exactly one other member decide to
work hard the return will be 260. etc.
Return and Costs For each unit produced, the members receive { con-
tingent on their particular role { ECU. The return is distributed according
to the following table.
Role A B C D
Factor 4 4 5 5
If you for instance have the role A in a particular round. Your wage factor
in this round is 4. You will then receive with a return of 180 units 720 ECU.
With a return of 500 units you will receive 2500 ECU etc.
Costs Working hard causes costs of 650 ECU. If you decide to work hard
650 ECU will be deducted from your return. If you decide to work normal
nothing will be deducted.
IRS: For instance if you have the wage factor 5 in a particular round, and
you and exactly one other group member decides to work hard the return
from the project will be 220. You will then receive 220x5 = 1100ECU, minus
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ECU.
LIN: For instance if you have the wage factor 5 in a particular round, and
you and exactly one other group member decides to work hard, the return
of the project is 340. You will then receive 340x5 = 1360ECU, minus costs
of 650 for working hard, and your return in this round will be 450 ECU.
Procedure You will rst have the opportunity to test the software for
ve minutes. Here you will be acting in all four roles simultaneously. Nothing
that you will do in these ve minutes will have any implication on your payo.
Also no other participant will be able to observe what you are doing. After
the ve minute test phase the second phase starts.
NI At the beginning you will learn which of the four roles you were
assigned to in this round. Then, as explained above, the participants will
decide one after the other whether to work hard or normal in this round
(rst A then B then C etc.) After you have taken your decision we will ask
about your expectations. Please state how you think the other members have
decided. At the end of the round you will be informed about the decision
of the other members and your payo in this round. In the next round the
random mechanism will again assign you one of the four roles.
CI At the beginning you will learn which of the four roles you have in
this round. Then, as explained above the participants will decide one after
the other whether to work hard or normal in this round (rst A then B then
C etc.) Before you take your decision you will learn the decision of your
predecessor. This means that B knows A's decision, C knows B's decision
and D knows C's decision. After you have taken your decision we will ask
about your expectations. Please state how you think the other members have
decided. At the end of the round you will be informed about the decision
of the other members and your payo in this round. In the next round the
random mechanism will again assign you one of the four roles.
FI: At the beginning you will learn which of the four roles you have in
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the other whether to work hard or normal in this round (rst A then B then
C etc.) Before you take your decision you will learn the decision of all your
predecessors. This means that B knows A's decision, C knows A's and B's
decision and D is aware of A's, B's and C's decision. After you have taken
your decision we will ask you { where appropriate { about your expectations.
Please state how you think the other members have decided. At the end of
the round you will be informed about the decision of the other members and
your payo in this round. In the next round the random mechanism will
again assign you one of the four roles.
The end of the experiment
After you have completed the 12 rounds the experiment is over. One
round will be selected at random for payment. For every participant his or
her payo is the return achieved in that round. Also for ever participant one
round will be selected at random for the expectations. However, this round
will not be the same as the one chosen for payment. A correct expectation
will be rewarded with 150 ECU. At the end we will ask you to ll out a
questionnaire. Please remain seated until we call your cabin number. Thank
you for participating in this experiment and have a nice day.
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Note: a belief is categorized as optimistic (pessimistic) if a player guessed that the other
player contributed (did not contribute), when in fact the opposite was true.
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